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Manifest Criminality, Criminal Intent, and
the "Metamorphosis of Larceny"
Lloyd L. Weinrebt
Professor George Fletcher has described two "general patterns of
criminality," which, he says, have explanatory value over a large
range of the criminal law.' The "pattern of manifest criminality"
requires that conduct punishable as a crime be criminal on its face;
its criminality must be "objectively discernible at the time that it oc-
curs. The assumption is that a neutral third-party observer could
recognize the activity as criminal even if he had no special knowl-
edge about the offender's intention. '2 In contrast, the "pattern of
subjective criminality" takes as its starting point the assumption
that "the core of criminal conduct is the intention to violate a le-
gally protected interest."3 "The only reason we require that offend-
ers act on their intention is to make sure that the intention is firm
and not merely fantasy. '4
The "tension" between these two patterns, Professor Fletcher
says, "pervades a wide field of the criminal law."'5 He finds some
evidence of them in various doctrines of the law. 6 His principal evi-
dence, however, is the law of larceny, which, he says, underwent a
"metamorphosis" at the end of the eighteenth century from the
pattern of manifest criminality to the pattern of subjective crimi-
nality.7 He argues further that we should resist what he perceives
to be the current dominance of the pattern of subjective criminal-
ity. 8 Not only may its emphasis on the actor's intention lead us to
t Professor, Harvard Law School.
1. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 115 (1978) [hereinafter cited without cross-
reference as RETHINKING]. The two patterns are discussed generally in RETHINKING at
115-234.
2. Id. at 116.
3. Id. at 118.
4. Id. at 119.
5. Id. at 115.
6. See pp. 311-16infra.
7. See pp. 296-310 infra. The historical account of larceny was first presented in an arti-
cle, Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REv. 469 (1976). Although some of
the details have been changed, the accounts in the book and the article are essentially alike.
8. "[T]he resonance of subjective criminality is surely the dominant theme of contem-
porary criminal jurisprudence." RETHINKING at 234; see id. at 129, 166-67, 173-74.
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intrude too much into the private realm.9 More generally, it re-
flects a utilitarian, "social engineering" view of the criminal law,
which encourages early intervention against a dangerous person,
whether or not he is justly subject to punishment for his actual
conduct.10
We have reason to be grateful to Professor Fletcher for his large-
scale effort to "rethink" the criminal law. His work reminds us that
our search for the values that ought to inform the law has need of
the understandings of the past, even if we conclude that they are
not adequate to our present situation. Approval of the enterprise,
however, does not in this case carry with it agreement with the re-
sults. The claims that are made for the explanatory power of these
patterns are large, as are the implications drawn from them about
the current direction of the criminal law. It is consequently of some
importance to set the record straight. Professor Fletcher has seri-
ously misconstrued the historical evidence on which he relies.
There was no "metamorphosis" of larceny such as he claims. A
theory of manifest criminality does not occupy, above or below the
surface, the place he gives it in the development of the English law
of theft. Without that historical support, his evidence of two dis-
tinct and opposed patterns of criminality consists only of scattered
references to the actor's conduct or to his intent, according to the
circumstances. The evidence indicates neither, on the one hand, a
theory that the criminality of an act had to be manifest on its face
nor, on the other, a theory that the actor's intention was the law's
main concern and his conduct significant merely as corroboration
of criminal intent. Indeed, without the prop of an inaccurate his-
torical record, the idea of "manifest criminality" as a general pat-
tern appears to a considerable degree incoherent.
I agree with Professor Fletcher's general observations about the
importance of protecting our private lives from too intrusive ef-
forts to "punish" "dangerous" persons whose conduct has not re-
sulted in actual harm. There is no convincing evidence that the
criminal law's strong insistence on criminal intent has led us in that
direction. Similarly, I agree that the justice of punishment must be
our overriding concern, and that we ought not adopt a simple view
that criminal law is merely one among a variety of legal "instru-
ments of social control." In that respect also, the emphasis in
9. Id. at 121, 131. Elsewhere he has written that proving intent as the subjective pattern
requires leads to "an intrusive and open-ended investigation into the life of the accused."
Fletcher, supra note 7, at 473.
10. RETHINKING at 100-02, 118-19, 170-74.
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Anglo-American criminal law on criminal intent has seemed to
most observers to be wise."1 In a society that rests on fundamental
assumptions of human self-determination and responsibility, the
requirement of criminal intent as an element of criminal conduct
has been a restraint against punishment for unintended harms that
are beyond the responsible control of the actor. Of course, Profes-
sor Fletcher's injunction against inquiring too far into criminal in-
tent need not be carried to the opposite extreme of disregarding
intent altogether. 2 There is danger, however, that a preoccupation
with "manifest criminality" would have that result, so that conduct
that appeared "self-evidently" to be criminal would be found with-
out more to be what it appeared.' 3 If we have reason in some areas
of the law to be on guard against punishing too soon, without
paying close enough attention to the harm to be avoided, we have
as much reason to be on guard against punishing simply because
harm was done, without attention to the actor's intent, or lack of
intent, to do the harm in question.' 4
Larceny
Professor Fletcher's discovery of a nineteenth-century metamor-
phosis of the law of larceny rests principally on his analysis of two
well-known cases: The Carrier's Case,' 5 decided in 1473, and The
King v. Pear,'6 decided in 1779. In the first case, he says, "we find
the principle of manifest criminality most clearly at work."'17 Crimi-
nal liability arose out of the "shared image of the thief," which pre-
11. See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 133-41, 325-59 (2d ed.
1947); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 255-61 (2d ed. 1961); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 413-25, 429-36 (1958).
12. Professor Fletcher would allow a person to prove "non-intent . as a challenge to
the authenticity of appearances." RETHINKING at 117.
13. Professor Fletcher's own discussion suggests the danger. He acknowledges that
there may be no activity "that can always and reliably be identified as criminal." But, he
says, it is mistaken "to focus excessively" on problems of intention, since it is "the simple
fact of experience . . . that we can tell when a crime is occurring. In the vast majority of
cases what we perceive to be a ... [crime] is in fact just that." RETHINKING at 116. See p.
318 infra.
14. See, for example, cases extending responsibility for felony murder beyond deaths
caused by the acts of the felons themselves. E.g., Taylor v. Superior Court of Alameda
County, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970); People v. Hickman, 59 Ill.
2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974). In such cases, the felons' "manifest criminality" has a good
deal to do with the willingness of courts to extend their liability to all harms connected
with their conduct, whatever their intent.
15. Y.B. Pasch. 13 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 5 (1473), reprinted in 64 SELDEN Soc'y 30 (1945)
[hereinafter cited to the Selden Society reprint and translation].
16. 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (Exch. Ch. 1779) [hereinafter cited only to Eng.
Rep.].
17. RETHINKING at 83.
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vailed over another doctrine that one who had lawful possession of
goods could not be convicted of larceny if he misappropriated
them.' 8 He contends that Pear, on the other hand, as it was con-
strued by East and later interpreted, made the intent to
steal-animusfurandi-critical, thus making it possible to convict a
person of larceny for an apparently lawful taking of possession
accompanied by such intent. Professor Fletcher credits East with
having nearly disposed of the requirement of an unlawful act alto-
gether; according to East, he says, "a routine act such as a lessee's
laying hands on a horse becomes criminal if at that moment the les-
see is visited with the wrong kind of intention."' 9 The report of
neither case supports these contentions.
In The Carrier's Case, a foreign merchant entrusted his goods to a
carrier for transportation elsewhere. Instead of delivering them as
charged, the carrier broke open the bales and took their contents.
The Yearbook reports a discussion of the question whether the car-
rier had committed the felony of larceny. 20 Had the carrier taken
the goods from the merchant against his will there would have
been no question; a "trespassory" taking of that sort was the para-
digm of larceny. The carrier, however, had received the goods with
the merchant's consent; it being understood that a taking from
possession was an element of the crime, the carrier's conduct did
not conform to the paradigm.
Of the eight persons whose views are reported, seven concluded
that a felony had been committed. Five thought that the carrier's
intent was the critical issue. 2' The Chancellor's view is reported in
its entirety as follows: "Felony is according to the intent, and the in-
tent here may just as well be felony as if he had not possession. '"22
Molyneux concluded:
[t]o the same effect. A thing done lawfully may be said to be
felony or trespass according to the intent and the circum-
stances, to wit, if he who committed the act does not carry
out the purpose for which he took the goods.... [S]o, by his
action later, it may be said to be felony or trespass according to
the intent etc. 23
18. Id. at 84.
19. Id. at 94.
20. Goods taken feloniously and recovered were "waif," forfeited to the King. The case
involved a contest for the goods between the merchant and the sheriff of London, who
claimed the goods as the King's delegate.
21. Professor Fletcher disposes of these views in a footnote. RETHINKING at 67 n.3 1.
22. 64 SELDEN Soc'Y, supra note 15, at 31.
23. Id.
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Vavasour, likewise, based his conclusion that the carrier had
committed a felony on the proof that he had taken the goods "as a
felon and with other intent than to carry them. '24 Laken also be-
lieved that even if the carrier had possession of the goods pursuant
to a contract with the merchant, "if he takes them with other intent
than to carry them, so that he does not carry out the purpose, it
seems that it shall quite well be said to be felony. '25 Huse played on
what we should understand as the distinction between title and
possession. Concluding that "the property remains in him who
made the bailment," he agreed with the others that if the carrier
claimed the goods "feloniously without cause from the party with
intent to defraud him to whom the property belongs, animo
furandi," it was felony.26
Bryan, Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and appar-
ently the conservative of the group, insisted that there was no fel-
ony because the requirement of a taking from possession had not
been met: "[F]or where they aver that the party has possession by
bailment and lawful delivery, there cannot afterwards be said to be
felony or trespass touching this. '27 Needham disagreed. He
referred to several not very similar cases to show that the concept
of trespass had enough flexibility to cover the facts. 8 Finally,
Choke agreed with Bryan "that where a man has goods in his pos-
session by reason of bailment, 'he cannot take them feloniously
when he is in possession. '2 9 Nevertheless, he agreed with the ma-
jority that the carrier was a felon. The critical fact, he argued, was
that the carrier had opened the bales and taken their contents:
[H]ere the things which were in the bales were not given to
him, but the bales as chose entire were delivered ut supra to
carry etc. in which case if he had given away the bales or sold
them, it would not be felony, but when he broke open and
took out of it what was inside, he did this without warrant 30
24. Id.
25. Id. at 33.
26. Id. at 31.
27. Id. at 30-31.
28. Id. at 33. The cases to which Needham referred are: (1) a person who has en-
trusted goods to another secretly removes them, intending to recover damages from the
other person for their loss; (2) the owner gives goods to another person who is to deliver
them to the owner's house; after having delivered the goods to the house, the person car-
rying them takes them away again; (3) a person having a drink in a tavern makes off with
the cup in which the drink was served; and (4) a servant carries off his master's goods
from the master's house. Needham evidently regarded the first case as a variant illustration
of the principle exemplified by the latter three.
29. Id. at 31-32.
30. Id. at 32.
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Choke found this curious distinction in two situations that he
thought analogous.
Thus if a man is given a tun of wine to carry, if he sells the
tun, it is not felony or trespass, but if he took out twenty pints
it is felony, for the twenty pints were not given to him, and
peradventure he had no knowledge of it at the time of the
bailment. So it is if I give the key of my chamber to anyone, if
he takes my goods in this chamber, it is felony for they were
not given to him.3 1
All of these views express concern for the familiar elements of
larceny, felonious intent and a taking from possession, without ref-
erence to the thief's "manifest" behavior. It requires more than a
little ingenuity to find evidence of "the principle of manifest crimi-
nality ... at work"32 or even on the job site. Professor Fletcher ar-
gues nevertheless that it is there. The aspect of manifest thievery,
he says, "is captured in the moment of breaking of the bales; the
judges were less likely to sense thievery in the acts of selling or giv-
ing away the bales."33 Aside from the puzzle of why we should sup-
pose, contrary to the statements of most of those whose views are
reported, that judges and lawyers of the time would not equally
have "sensed thievery" if the carrier had sold or given away the un-
broken bales,34 there is simply nothing in the report of the case to
support Professor Fletcher's analysis. He finds support in
Needham's reference to an owner who, having entrusted goods to
another person, comes "secretly like a felon" and retakes them.
That, Professor Fletcher says, is "an explicit reference to the princi-
ple of manifest criminality. '35 The passage from which those words
are drawn will hardly bear that construction. The example of the
owner is but one of several in the same passage, which Needham
offers to show the possibility of trespass in situations where the thief
had previously held the property lawfully.3 6 Read in its entirety,
31. Id.
32. See p. 296 supra (quoting RETHINKING at 83).
33. RETHINKING at 83.
34. Professor Fletcher recognizes that he solves the puzzle only by "a stipulation about
the knowledge attributable to ideal observers," and admits that by application of appropri-
ate stipulations, any conduct will be "manifestly criminal." RETHINKING at 83. He does not
explain why one stipulation rather than another is appropriate, however, except apparently
by reference to the "conventional acceptability of the behavior under the circumstances,"
id. That is of no help in The Carrier's Case. The same stipulation that would make breaking
bulk manifestly criminal would make a sale or gift of the goods equally manifestly criminal
or more so. See pp. 310-11 infra.
35. RETHINKING at 84.
36. See note 28 supra. The reference to secrecy in the example on which Professor
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particularly in the context of the general discussion, Needham's
view no more than any of the others indicates that a notion of
"manifest thievery" was significant explicitly or implicitly in the
reasoning of the court.
The inapt reference to Needham aside, Professor Fletcher does
not claim that the theory of "manifest criminality" is manifest in
the report of The Carrier's Case itself. Rather, that theory is the key
to an "enigma" of the common law; 37 it explains why Choke's doc-
trine of "breaking bulk" became the rule of the case. "The signifi-
cance of the Carrier's Case," he says, "is that it was received into
the tradition as holding that manifest criminality should prevail
over the principle of possessorial immunity. ' 38 Once again, how-
ever, there is no historical evidence to support this assertion.
All of the commentaries on The Carrier's Case down to the end of
the eighteenth century (when, according to Professor Fletcher's
theory, the element of intent in larceny became prominent) dis-
cussed it in the context of felonious intent and trespassory taking.
Professor Fletcher states, "Blackstone was apparently the first com-
mentator to explicate the rule of 'breaking bulk' as an instance of
manifest criminality. '39 Blackstone, however, explicates the rule
simply as an instance where there is the requisite proof of felonious
intent. His actual statement is that in a case of breaking bulk and
others that he mentions, "the animus furandi is manifest. '4° His
analysis of larceny unmistakably requires both a taking and, as a
separate matter, proof of animus furandi, the felonious intent. He
treats the requirements of a taking and felonious intent in separate
sections, numbered separately and separated by a discussion of the
further requirement of a carrying away.41 Not only is there no af-
firmative indication of a requirement of manifest criminality. The
conclusion of his discussion of felonious intent speaks conclusively
to the contrary:
The ordinary discovery of a felonious intent is where the party
doth it clandestinely; or being charged with the fact, denies it.
But this is by no means the only criterion of criminality; for in
cases that may amount to larceny the variety of circumstances
Fletcher relies simply fulfills the requirement that the owner's retaking of his goods be
trespassory, that is, against the will of the then-lawful possessor.
37. RETHINKING at 60; see id. at 66, 83.
38. Id. at 84.
39. Id. at 84 n.33.
40. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *230.
41. Id. at *230-32.
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is so great, and the complications thereof so mingled, that it is
impossible to recount all those, which may evidence a felonious
intent, or animus furandi: wherefore they must be left to the
due and attentive consideration of the court and jury.42
Other commentators before and after Blackstone give the same
account. Coke, for example, on whose authority Blackstone relied
for the rule of breaking bulk, discusses the elements of felonious
intent and "an actual taking" separately, and nowhere suggests
integrating the two as "manifest criminality. '43 Breaking bulk is
mentioned as one of several special examples in Coke's discussion
of taking, without any indication that the examples are to be ex-
plained by that theory.44 Hale and Hawkins are to the same ef-
fect.45 Two commentators express puzzlement about the rule mak-
ing breaking bulk especially significant, in terms that contradict a
theory of manifest criminality. Dalton, referring to the same argu-
ment about "property" that Huse had made,46 wonders why a car-
rier who took the goods would not be guilty even if he did not
break bulk.47 Kelyng is still more explicit:
But I marvel at the Case put, 13 E.4.9.b. That if a Carrier have
a Tun of Wine delivered to him to carry to such a Place, and
he never carry it but sell it, all this is no Felony; but if he draw
part of it out above the Value of Twelve pence, this is Felony;
I do not see why the disposing of the whole should not be Fel-
ony also. 48
Writing in 1803, East observed that, with one exception, "all other
writers, as far as I can find, have put this case upon the same
footing as Lord Hale; namely, that the privity of contract is deter-
mined by the act of breaking the package which makes him a tres-
passer. 49
42. Id. at *232. Blackstone was borrowing, directly or by way of some intermediate bor-
rower, almost identical language in Hale's History of the Pleas of the Crown, which had been
available in manuscript and was published in full in 1736. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 509 (London 1736).
43. E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 107-08 (London 1644).
44. Id.
45. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 49-51 (London 1678); 1 M. HALE, supra note 42, at
504-09; 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 90 (London 1716). See
also M. DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 230-31 (London 1618); W. STANFORD, LES PLEES
DEL CORON 25 (London 1557).
46. See p. 298 supra.
47. M. DALTON, supra note 45, at 231.
48. J. KELYNG, A REPORT OF DIVERS CASES IN PLEAS OF THE CROWN 83 (London 1708).
49. 2 E. EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 697 (London 1803). The ex-
ception was Kelyng, who thought that the significance of breaking bulk was that it supplied
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Professor Fletcher states that under the theory of manifest crimi-
nality as it developed in this period, "[t]he primary inquiry was the
act of larceny"; "the law was structured so as to render intent a sub-
sidiary issue," which arose "only in extraordinary cases." 50 One can
only ask what is the basis for the statement. It is beyond dispute
that none of the commentators thought that the law was so struc-
tured. Coke, for example, begins his discussion of the elements of
larceny with intent: "First it must be felonious, id est, cum animo
furandi, as hath been said. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea."'
Far from perceiving the issue of intent as at all extraordinary, Hale
and Blackstone conclude their discussion of intent with an admoni-
tion that the variety and complexity of circumstances that may evi-
dence felonious intent are so great that it is impossible to recount
them and they must be left to the court and jury.52 The
commentaries contain examples of cases in which the finding of
larceny depends on the actor's fraudulent intent, an element that is
not visible at all in "the act of larceny" and must be proved inde-
pendently. Professor Fletcher mentions the examples of larceny in
fraudem legis that involved a fraudulent use of legal process.5 3
There are others as well, all of them inconsistent with the generali-
zation that "[t]he issue of intent in larceny was not thought of sepa-
rately from the manifestation of that intent in the external
world."
5 4
proof of the necessary felonious intent. See J. KELYNG, supra note 48, at 81-83. Blackstone
may also have adopted that analysis. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *230. Both
Kelyng and Blackstone place their discussion of breaking bulk in The Carrier's Case within a
general discussion of the requirement of a taking. Although they looked on breaking bulk
as evidence of felonious intent, that fact was significant not only in itself but also (and at
least in Blackstone's case primarily) because thereby the delivery did not preclude a finding
of the necessary trespass.
50. RETHINKING at 86.
51. E. COKE, supra note 43, at 107.
52. See p. 301 & note 42 supra.
53. RETHINKING at 85 n.35.
54. Id. at 85. The particular case of larceny infraudem legis that Professor Fletcher dis-
cusses involved looting following enforcement of a fraudulently obtained writ of ejectment,
facts that perhaps can be accommodated to manifest criminality. Other such cases are not
so easily accommodated, for example, the fraudulent use of legal process to obtain delivery
of someone else's horse, discussed in E. COKE, supra note 43, at 108; 1 M. HALE, supra note
42, at 507; 1 W. HAWKINS, supra note 45, at 90. Examples of larceny not involving abuse of
legal process where intent is critical are given in I M. HALE, supra note 42, at 507 ("If the
sheep of A. stray from the flock of A. into the flock of B. and B. drives them along with his
flock, or by pure mistake shears him, this is not a felony, but if he know it to be another's,
and marks it with his mark, this is an evidence of a felony."); id. at 509, and in 1 W.
HAWKINS, supra note 45, at 91 (lodger who rents lodgings with intention to steal the furni-
ture and does so is guilty of larceny "inasmuch as his whole Design was to defraud the
Law, and the Consent of the Owner was grounded on the Supposition of his coming as a
Lodger, and could never have been gained if the Truth had appeared, which the Party
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There is, in short, no evidence either in the report of The Carri-
er's Case or its subsequent treatment to support Professor Fletcher's
novel theory, and very strong evidence in both to contradict it.
Even if one were to ignore the evidence, the theory on its own
terms is dubious as a solution for the enigma that he finds in the
case. Suppose two carriers are hired to deliver the merchant's
goods to Southampton: one breaks the bales and goes off with the
contents; the other sells the bales intact to a stranger, pockets the
proceeds, and departs. Which of the two is, at that moment, the
more "manifest" thief? Can we suppose that, whatever he might
think of the first carrier, the merchant would not immediately cry
"Thief" if he observed the transaction of the second? It is difficult
to believe that one displays his felonious intent so much more
clearly (if at all) than the other, as Professor Fletcher's theory re-
quires.55 In fact, although Choke's analysis is not unassailable, his
reliance on breaking bulk is understood much more easily on the
ground that Choke himself stated, as an analogy to the earlier cases
in which a trespassory taking was found despite a prior delivery,
than on a covert intuition of manifest thievery.
56
If The Carrier's Case is not given the special meaning with which
shall get no Advantage by falsifying"). Kelyng describes Hawkins' example of the lodger as
a case of larceny in fraudem legis. J. KELYNG, supra note 48, at 82. If it is so regarded, that
category of larceny, which Professor Fletcher regards as exceptional, is not limited to abuse
of legal process and obviously anticipates larceny by trick as it was described in The King v.
Pear. See pp. 306-08 infra.
55. See note 34 supra.
56. Professor Fletcher criticizes the analysis of authorities like Stephen and Hall, who,
he says, make "a priori arguments about the necessary influence of social and political
forces in shaping the law." RETHINKING at 68. A simpler way to satisfy the forces that they
suggest favored protection of the alien merchant, he says, would have been to declare that
the taking was not felonious, in which case the merchant would have recovered his goods.
That argument, like his argument that the protection afforded to merchants by application
of the criminal law was offset by the risk that goods would be lost as waif, see p. 297 & note
20 supra, is a blinkered response to Hall's much more general, convincing account of the
policies that supported giving the protection of the law to merchants who entrusted their
goods to others for commercial reasons. See J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 14-33 (2d
ed. 1952). (In fact, having declared that there was felony, the judges nevertheless managed
to return the goods to the merchant, on the ground that he was an alien to whom the King
had granted a covenant of safe and secure conduct, so that the King could not claim the
stolen goods as waif. 64 SELDEN Soc'Y, supra note 15, at 34.)
Professor Fletcher urges also that even if Hall's account is accurate, it fails to explain
why the line was drawn just where it was, rather than broadly enough to include all cases
of a carrier who made off with a merchant's goods. RETHINKING at 69-70. The conceptual
importance of the element of trespass coupled with the analogies on which Choke relied,
see p. 298 supra, furnish an explanation. Cf. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAw 449 (5th ed. 1956); 3 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 139 (1883). As noted above, pp. 297-98 supra, a majority of those whose views
are expressed were willing to go the further distance. Later commentators relied on
Choke's analysis, but none of them supports Professor Fletcher's theory.
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Professor Fletcher invests it, the other evidence that he offers for a
pattern of manifest criminality in the crime of larceny up to the
end of the eighteenth century lacks persuasiveness. There were a
variety of situations in which the law held that it was larceny to mis-
appropriate goods that had been lawfully acquired for a limited
purpose.57 Professor Fletcher suggests that once again the princi-
ple of manifest criminality is at work; here, he says, it expands
criminal liability by rejecting the rule of possessorial immunity "in
those cases in which the taking typically conformed to the shared
image of thieving."58 His analysis is considerably tortured, how-
ever, as he recognizes, by the difficulty of explaining how criminal-
ity is more "manifest" in the cases that were held to be felony than
in those that were not.59 The cases are far more sensibly under-
stood as applications of the flexible notion of trespass already evi-
dent in The Carrier's Case. With sufficient determination, one can
force that element of larceny into the framework of manifest crimi-
nality; one way or another, any aspect of a situation that is found to
satisfy the requirement of trespass can be described as the neces-
sary manifestation. But the idea of manifest criminality, referring
to a distinct group of acts manifestly criminal in themselves, then
loses all meaning. It is, in any event, superfluous and not what is
discussed in the cases.
Professor Fletcher's remaining evidence for his theory in the
crime of larceny is surprisingly a line of modern cases that he de-
scribes as "staged larceny": cases in which a would-be thief is sus-
pected in advance and allowed to carry out the would-be theft be-
57. Chisser's Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 142 (K.B. 1678), furnishes an example. Chisser asked
to see two cravats, which the shopkeeper put into his hands. He asked their price and,
after offering her a smaller sum, immediately ran out of the shop with the cravats. Accord-
ing to the report, Chisser was guilty because
[a]lthough these goods were delivered to Chisser by the owner, yet they were not out
of her possession by such delivery, till the property should be altered by the perfection
of the contract, which was but inchoated and never perfected between the parties; and
when Chisser run away with the goods, it was as if he had taken them up, lying in the
shop, and run away with them.
Id. at 142-43.
Professor Fletcher suggests that Raymond, the reporter of the case, provided two distinct
analyses of the result: the one above, which makes Chisser guilty when he runs away, and
another, which would make Chisser guilty when the cravats were delivered to him. The
former is said to appear in the third paragraph of the report and the latter in the second
paragraph. See RETHINKING at 99 & nn.38 & 40; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 487 n.78, 513
n.176. The entire report consists of three paragraphs. Such a reading of it is not serious.
Professor Fletcher also mistakenly attributes the nonexistent alternative analysis of Chisser
to East. RETHINKING at 99; see 2 E. EAST, supra note 49, at 683, 687. See generally pp. 307-08
infra.
58. RETHINKING at 83.
59. Id.
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fore he is caught. In such cases, he asserts, it is the absence of "the
features of manifest criminality" that accounts for the acquittal of
"obviously dishonest and dangerous people. ' 60 He makes the opin-
ion in Topolewski v. State61 the focus of his discussion.6 2 There the
defendant sought to enlist the aid of Dolan, a former employee of
a meat-packing company, to steal some barrels of meat. Dolan re-
ported the plan to a supervisor at the company, who directed him
to feign cooperation. The defendant and Dolan discussed various
plans and agreed on one, which Dolan reported to the supervisor.
The supervisor arranged for barrels of meat to be placed on the
loading platform pursuant to the plan, and instructed the platform
boss, who knew nothing of the plot or counter-plot, to let the per-
son who came for the barrels take them away. The defendant
loaded the barrels onto his truck and drove off.
As Professor Fletcher recognizes, the opinion is addressed
plainly to the issue of trespass: whether the acts of the company's
personnel went too far in cooperation with the defendant and con-
stituted a delivery of the barrels, so as to "take from the transaction
the element of trespass or nonconsent essential to the crime.
63
However, he regards all of the discussion, repeatedly cast in terms
of delivery or trespass, as in reality only "effective rhetoric" to re-
veal the underlying dispositive pattern of manifest criminality.64
Unless once again he is simply rendering "manifest criminality" as
a synonym for trespass, that is a gratuitous analysis. The court ob-
serves that the requirement of a trespass
does not militate against a person's being free to set a trap to
catch one whom he suspects of an intention to commit the
crime of larceny, but the setting of such trap must not go fur-
ther than to afford the would-be thief the amplest opportunity
to carry out his purpose, formed without such inducement on
the part of the owner of the property, as to put him in the po-
sition of having consented to the taking.65
One who took advantage of such an opportunity plainly need not
have been acting any differently on the surface of things than a
60. Id. at 70, 86. The cases that Professor Fletcher discusses arose after the claimed
"metamorphosis of larceny" that is supposed to have done away with manifest criminality;
but, he says, "it survives in corners of the law, such as cases on staged larceny." Id. at 234.
61. 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 (1906).
62. RETHINKING at 72-76, 86-88.
63. 130 Wis. at 250, 109 N.W. at 1039.
64. RETHINKING at 86.
65. 130 Wis. at 254-55, 109 N.W. at 1041.
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person acting lawfully. Yet, according to the court, there would be
trespass and hence larceny. What persuaded the court that the
company's connivance had gone too far was the combined effect of
Dolan's discussion with the defendant and agreement to assist him,
the placing of the barrels on the loading platform pursuant to the
plan, and the platform boss's presence and indications of consent
while the barrels were loaded. 66 Even with all that the court
thought the facts were near the borderline.67 There is no need or
reason to go beyond the court's own analysis in terms of trespass
and look for a suppressed intuition of what it is to behave like a
thief.68
The sum of the preceding discussion is that the law of larceny as
it developed up to the decision of Pear in 1779 displayed consistent
attention to the requirements of felonious intent and a trespassory
taking. The latter element referred to the paradigm of a literal tak-
ing from possession against the will of the possessor, but was ex-
tended in a variety of situations to other appropriations by one
doctrinal device or another. The cases and the commentary reveal
no concern for "manifest criminality."
The King v. Pear marked no departure from that development.
Pear rented a horse from Finch's livery stable. He told Finch that
he intended to ride to Sutton and would return that night; also, he
lied to Finch about his address. Instead of going to Sutton, he sold
the horse. At his trial for larceny, the jury found specially that he
intended to sell the horse when he rented it. Upon that finding, he
was convicted. The case was referred to the whole court, a majority
of which upheld the conviction. They concluded that, Pear's origi-
nal intention having been fraudulent, "the parting with the prop-
erty had not changed the nature of the possession, but that it
remained unaltered in the prosecutor at the time of the con-
version. '69 That analysis is, of course, no more than another ap-
plication of the familiar device of leaving possession "construc-
tively" in the owner;70 the sale of the horse contrary to the terms of
the rental agreement (or perhaps some prior violation of the
terms) was then a conversion, and the requirement of trespass was
66. Id. at 250, 256-57, 109 N.W. at 1039, 1041.
67. Id. at 251, 109 N.W. at 1039.
68. Indeed, having asserted that his "account of acquittal in cases of staged larceny
demonstrates the explanatory value" of the pattern of manifest criminality, Professor
Fletcher immediately goes on to acknowledge that the explanation is ad hoc and not ade-
quate to deal with closely similar cases. RETHINKING at 87-88.
69. 168 Eng. Rep. 208, 209 (Exch. Ch. 1779).
70. See note 28 supra.
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satisfied. The device was a fiction, to be sure. We may agree that
the judges were inventive; but the necessity that was the mother of
their invention was the traditional conception of larceny that made
a trespassory taking essential. No "metamorphosis" was anticipated
and none was wrought.
Professor Fletcher declares, however, that when East wrote his
version of the case, which was published in 1803, he radically al-
tered the judges' reasoning. East, he says, interpreted Pear to elimi-
nate the requirement of a conversion altogether, so that "Pear
could have been arrested as soon as he mounted the horse.17 1
East's interpretation, he adds, which made Pear's crime depend on
his intent when he received the horse, gave expression to a new at-
titude toward criminality that elevated the importance of intent
and made manifest criminality secondary.72
It is difficult indeed to read East's report of Pear as Professor
Fletcher does. The report is thorough and detailed; nowhere does
East suggest a disagreement with the earlier report of Leach. Dis-
cussing the facts of the case, he says that "the obtaining the posses-
sion of the mare, and afterwards disposing of her in the manner stated"
was a trespass, which, accompanied by "felonious intent at the time
of obtaining the possession," constituted larceny at common law.73
In a series of examples to illustrate the rule on which the judges
relied, he includes the element of a conversion.74 Since Pear had
sold the horse, there was no dispute that there had been a conver-
sion. Far from eliminating that requirement, East plainly took it for
granted. Professor Fletcher presumably relies on several statements
out of context, to the effect that a taking with felonious intent con-
stitutes larceny. Such statements are part of East's discussion of the
circumstances in which a delivery precludes finding the trespass es-
sential to larceny. He emphasized the distinction between a taking
with felonious intent at the time of taking (as in Pear), in which case
there may be larceny, and a taking without such intent, in which
case there would be no larceny despite a subsequent conversion.
Professor Fletcher's argument might be compared to the sugges-
tion that the statement, "An unlawful killing with malice afore-
thought is murder, without malice aforethought manslaughter,"
71. RETHINKING at 94. "A subsequent conversion of the horse would not be required
and Pear presumably could have been arrested as soon as he left the stable." Fletcher, su-
pra note 7, at 507.
72. RETHINKING at 94-95.
73. 2 E. EAST, supra note 49, at 688 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 687.
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puts in doubt the requirement that the victim of a homicide be a
human being. Were this reading of East plausible, it would be as-
tonishing that none of the nineteenth-century commentators
picked it up.7 5 In any event, even without East's supposed altera-
tion, it is impossible to find "manifest criminality" in Pear's con-
duct; obviously, if his criminality had been manifest to Finch, who
was on the scene, Finch would not have rented him the horse.76
The judges in Pear, like their predecessors, were concerned to de-
cide whether the facts of the case fit, or could reasonably be made
to fit, the requirements of trespass and felonious intent.
Judges in the nineteenth century sometimes proved willing to
find trespass far from the paradigm, for example in circumstances
where, because of accident or mistake, the defendant acquired pos-
session without initiative on his part or direct interference with the
owner's interest.77 Rather than reflecting any "metamorphosis,"
such cases were simply extensions to new situations of the tradi-
tional pattern of thought. Professor Fletcher correctly discerns in
such cases, as well as in the extension of other crimes against prop-
75. The suggestion in Fletcher, supra note 7, at 513 n.177, that the "new view of lar-
ceny" originating with East (which eliminated the requirement of a conversion) is reflected
in Russell's nineteenth-century treatise, is based on a misunderstanding of the text on
which Professor Fletcher relies. The authors of the treatise discuss the case of Regina v.
Brooks, 173 Eng. Rep. 501 (1837), in which the defendant hired a horse and gig and then
offered to sell them to one Orbell; Orbell, being suspicious because of the low price, pre-
tended to agree to the purchase and, pretending to go to get the amount, summoned a
constable. Far from eliminating the requirement of a conversion, the authors argue that in
the peculiar circumstances, "as against . . . [the defendant] it might well have been held
that the conversion was complete." 2 W. RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMFS AND MISDEMEANORS
54-55 n.r (5th American from 3d London ed., C. Greaves ed. 1845). The treatise discusses
Pear several pages above the quoted passage and cites both Leach's and East's reports with-
out distinguishing them. The discussion does indeed make Pear's intention at the time he
obtained possession critical, but on the assumption, common also to Leach and East, that
there was a subsequent conversion. See id. at 50.
76. Professor Fletcher observes that the unaltered version of Pear "was at least partially
compatible with the traditional conception of larceny as manifest thievery. The moment of
thieving was displaced by the subsequent conversion and selling of the horse, which mani-
fested the purpose of misappropriation." RETHINKING at 93-94. That simply ignores the
unmistakable focus on Pear's intent when he rented the horse. Such analysis illustrates how
the term "manifest criminality" can be used to refer to whatever act constitutes the neces-
sary trespass, without adding to our understanding.
77. E.g., The Queen v. Middleton, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 38 (1873); The Queen v.
Ashwell, 16 Q.B.D. 190 (1885). Professor Fletcher discusses these cases in RETHINKING at
107-10. He asserts that Middleton is a "critical" case, which made "a radical extension of the
law of larceny." Id. at 107, 108. Once again, he incorrectly interprets the opinions as disre-
garding the requirement of a conversion, which, as the majority analyzed the facts, was
present beyond dispute. Bramwell, in dissent, thought that the case involved "great and
important principles," L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. at 54. But he would have been considerably sur-
prised to learn that what was so importantly at stake was "the requirement of an objectively
criminal act," RETHINKING at 109 n.28.
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erty, the law's increasing focus on dishonest acquisition as the core
of theft. The importance of protecting the interest in property
made it less important to distinguish one wrongful mode of acqui-
sition from another, especially if preservation of the distinctions
made it likely that some such acquisitions would slip through the
cracks and not be criminal at all.7 8 It may be that the pressure for
comprehensiveness was more intense in the nineteenth century
than it had been earlier. More likely, perhaps, that pressure is sim-
ply more apparent to us than comparable pressures in earlier cen-
turies to declare criminal acts that at the time seemed to be clearly
wrongful but nevertheless to lie at or just beyond the furthest
reach of the criminal law. Professor Fletcher is scornful of the as-
sumption "that the law always responds to the 'felt necessities of
the time.' -17 In fact, the law of theft is an excellent example of the
interplay between legal doctrine and changing social perceptions.
Changes in the law of larceny, accompanied by parallel changes in
the law of embezzlement and false pretenses, reflect with unusual
clarity a continuous development of that kind.
The outcome in England and this country alike was reformula-
tion of the law to replace the distinct crimes defined according to
method, with all the consequent difficulties of classification when
the facts fell along the borderlines, by a comprehensive crime of
theft.80 We should not suppose, however, that the process has nec-
essarily come to an end. From a comparable vantage, we might
find conduct that we now regard as beyond the scope of criminal
law as plainly criminal as the carrier's conduct. We should not as-
sume too readily that commercial practices, including perhaps
some forms of sales promotion, or methods of business competi-
tion, or violations of contractual rights, will not, under pressure of
changing shared values, be perceived as theft. Or, though this
78. For a famous American example of such a lucky thief, see Commonwealth v. King,
202 Mass. 379, 388-89, 88 N.E. 454, 458 (1909), reporting the case of O'Malley, who was
acquitted of larceny because the judge thought his crime was embezzlement and whose
subsequent conviction of embezzlement was reversed because the appellate court concluded
that his crime was larceny after all.
The effort to fill the cracks is particularly evident in legislative responses, such as the
first English general embezzlement statutes, 39 Geo. 3, c. 85 (1799), in response to The
King v. Bazeley, 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (Exch. Ch. 1799), and 52 Geo. 3, c. 63 (1812), making
the coverage of embezzlement still more complete, in response to The King v. Walsh, 168
Eng. Rep. 624 (Exch. Ch. 1812), which had held that the prior statute did not cover a
stockbroker.
79. RETHINKING at 68 (quoting O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881)).
80. In England, consolidation was effected by the Larceny Act of 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c.
50, revised and simplified by the Theft Act 1968, c. 60. For a model American statute, see
the MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.0-.9 (1962).
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seems less likely, we might no longer regard certain conduct that
today constitutes theft as appropriate for the criminal law.
Manifest Criminality
The theory of manifest criminality proceeds from the assump-
tion that the criminal aspect of prohibited behavior can ordinarily
be perceived simply by observing the criminal act; the crime as
criminal is "a recognizable event in the physical world."81 So, "if the
actor's intent to steal did not manifest itself in an externally identi-
fiable act of stealing, no larceny could be committed." '82 The thesis
should not be confused with a strong, even a very strong, requirement
that guilt be proved with certainty. The thesis is not about prov-
ing guilt at all. It is about the nature of the acts that are deemed
criminal. 83 Professor Fletcher's argument is that where it is applica-
ble, that approach to the definition of crimes is distinct from and
preferable to the approach that defines crimes by the conjunction
of prohibited conduct and criminal intent and allows the two to
be established independently. 84 The assumption that criminality
can generally be perceived as an observable characteristic of the
events that properly constitute crime is wrong. Furthermore, effort
to press it into service in place of explicit reliance on proof of crim-
inal intent would very likely harm the values of liberty and privacy
that Professor Fletcher wants to protect.
Whatever plausibility the notion of manifest criminality has in
the particular context of theft derives from the fact that the para-
digm includes a physical trespass, an actual taking of property
from the possession of another person. Even in that setting, it is
not difficult to imagine conduct that "externally" appears to be
theft but in fact is not. An observer who comes across two persons
struggling for possession of some object, say a bicycle, will not be
able to tell just from what he sees and hears which of the two is a
thief, or whether either is a thief, or even-if we exercise our
imaginations-whether both may not be thieves. We need to know
at least who owns the bicycle. If that sort of information is to be in-
cluded in Professor Fletcher's definition of a "recognizable" or "ex-
ternally identifiable" event in the physical world we are already a
81. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 476. See p. 294 supra.
82. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 473.
83. RETHINKING at 119, 232.
84. Professor Fletcher has made it clear that he does not believe that the theory of mani-
fest criminality has any application at all to large areas of criminal conduct. See pp. 315-16
infra. His preference for the pattern of manifest criminality is indicated in RETHINKING at
89, 121, 131. It is stated more strongly in Fletcher, supra note 7, at 528-29.
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long way from manifest criminality. 85 Even that, of course, will not
be enough. One bicycle is often enough mistaken reasonably and
genuinely for another. Or Smith and Jones may be struggling for
possession of Brown's bicycle, Smith because Brown has loaned it
to him and Jones because he believes that someone is about to
make off with his friend Brown's bicycle. Or any number of things.
Professor Fletcher's "shared image of the way thieves act"8 6 is in
fact a caricature of thievery: the masked bandit who creeps up
from behind, clubs his prey and makes off with the loot. In the
multiform real world, we cannot rely so comfortably on appear-
ances.
If we look beyond crimes that involve some physical act directed
toward a person or his property, the idea that criminality is visible
on the surface of an event loses its plausibility altogether. Quite
aside from Pear's secret intent, when he lied to Finch was that man-
ifest thievery or not? (That it was a lie was, of course, not part of an
"externally identifiable act.") Suppose he hadn't lied when he
rented the horse and instead of selling it had ridden it to a place
other than Sutton. Is that manifest thievery or only a violation of
the rental agreement? Of course, we might wait to see what Pear
does with the horse later. But then the notion of a manifest crime
committed at an identifiable moment has to be abandoned. We
have in fact come close to the unexceptionable principle, not only
in criminal law but in ordinary affairs, that a person's intent can of-
ten be proved by a course of conduct over time. If we see someone
in a restaurant remove another person's coat from a rack and walk
out with it, have we seen manifest thievery or not? If not, is a per-
son who deliberately selects the most attractive coat on the rack not
to be prosecuted? But if so, is everyone of us who had made such a
mistake presumptively a thief? If one person induces another to
buy something by a material misrepresentation of fact-once again,
not something observable as part of the act-is that manifest thiev-
ery? Do we not need to determine whether the misrepresentation
was an honest mistake or a deliberate falsehood-that is, the intent
behind the act?
Professor Fletcher makes a sustained effort to uncover the pat-
tern of manifest criminality in criminal attempts. He suggests that
there are two approaches to the definition of an attempt: a "mini-
malist" approach allied to an "'objectivist' theory of attempts" and
85. Of course, if we make the appropriate "stipulations," there is no problem. See note
34 supra.
86. RETHINKING at 116.
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a "maximalist" approach that is allied to a "subjectivist" theory.87
The former is closely related to the pattern of manifest criminality;
the latter, preoccupied with the issue of intent, to the pattern of
subjective criminality. This analysis is applied to two recurrent
problems in the law of attempts: (1) the distinction between "mere
preparation" for a crime, which is not itself criminal, and an at-
tempt, which is; and (2) whether an "impossible" attempt that is
bound not to succeed is nevertheless criminal in itself.
As Professor Fletcher acknowledges, there has been little enthu-
siasm in this country or in England for a criterion of manifest crim-
inality as the distinction between acts of preparation and a criminal
attempt.88 But, he suggests, its virtues have not been "fully
aired. 8 9 One of its virtues, he argues, is its resistance to the "social
engineering" or "administrative" approach to criminal law that
would favor the confinement of dangerous persons. The subjectiv-
ist approach, he says, shifts our attention "from the dangerousness
of acts to the dangerousness of persons; even an act that is not dan-
gerous in itself can reveal the actor to be dangerous." 90 There has
been a continuing debate about how far in advance of a completed
crime the line marking an attempt has been crossed. What Pro-
fessor Fletcher describes as the subjectivist approach is nowhere
evident; it has neither been espoused nor adopted. It is not a co-
incidence that he mentions no case in which the "subjectivist" dis-
tinction between preparation and attempt is made. 9' Recent cases
87. Id. at 138.
88. The name most closely associated with a requirement that the act by itself manifest
the criminal intent is Judge Salmond of the Supreme Court of New Zealand. He stated the
requirement in The King v. Barker, [1924] N.Z.L.R. 865, 872, 874-75 (Ct. App.) Relying
principally on the authority of Salmond, New Zealand for a time followed that rule. See
Campbell v. Ward, [1955] N.Z.L.R. 471, 474, 476. That is no longer the law. Crimes Act,
1961, § 72(3) (No. 43).
Sometimes it is said that the conduct constituting an attempt must be "unequivocal." It is
doubtful whether such language adopts Salmond's view that the act constituting the at-
tempt has to establish the necessary intent without reference to other circumstances or evi-
dence of intent. The testing case would be one in which there were an act otherwise satis-
fying that element of an attempt and unequivocal proof of criminal intent that was not
contained entirely in the act itself.
89. RETHINKING at 143.
90. Id. at 174; see id. at 143-44, 173-74.
91. Professor Fletcher perceives the Model Penal Code formulation as reflecting
the "subjectivist" approach. Id. at 167-68. The Code requires (in addition to the necessary
intent) "an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to
culminate in his commission of the crime." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1962). It pro-
vides further: "Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under Subsection
(1)(c) of this Section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose." Id.
§ 5.01(2). The latter section then lists certain kinds of conduct, like lying in wait, which "if
strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose" are not insufficient as a matter of
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that have discussed the distinction between preparation and at-
tempt have shown no tendency to convict a general category of
dangerous persons whose concrete conduct constituting the at-
tempt did not indicate a strong likelihood of commission of the un-
derlying offense. 2
The second virtue that is claimed for the criterion of manifest
criminality to distinguish preparation from attempt is that it ties
criminal attempts closely to the kind of conduct that arouses public
apprehension and is "unnerving to the community." 93 Professor
Fletcher recognizes that dependence on "the sentiments of the lo-
cal community" is not an unmixed blessing for the criminal de-
fendant; we cannot count on a community's apprehensions always
to be rational and just.9 4 He suggests, however, that the risk of be-
ing tyrannized by sentiments of unreason can be avoided if we rely
on "the community's sense of what is criminal and unnerving" only
to articulate rules "based on criteria of manifest criminality," and
not to decide particular cases.95 Experience may not assure the rest
of us that the unexamined apprehensions of the community are a
reliable source even for the rules or that once having appealed to
them for that purpose we shall so easily put them aside when the
rules are applied. In any case, it is evident that our hope and en-
deavor must be precisely that the rules and their application not re-
spond without the mediation of other principles to what the com-
munity regards as a manifestation of criminality.
The problem of impossibility in criminal attempts has confused
and bemused courts, commentators, teachers, and students alike.
law. It is true that drafters of the Code intended to draw "the line between attempt and
noncriminal preparation further away from the final act." Id. §§ 5.01-.05, Comment, at 25
(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). Nevertheless, the Code hardly fits Professor Fletcher's descrip-
tion of subjectivist theory:
The subjective approach is defined by the rejection of the claim that the act of at-
tempting is a distinct dimension of liability. For subjectivists, it is important that the ac-
tor take steps to execute his criminal intent, yet no specifically defined act is required
for liability. This means that no conviction should ever founder on the ground that
there was something wrong with the "act" element of attempting.
RETHINKING at 166-67.
Professor Fletcher dismisses as a mere "evidentiary rule," id. at 168, the Code's require-
ment that the actor's conduct be "strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose."
That requirement applies some of the reasoning that underlies the "res ipsa loquitur" test
favored by Salmond, see note 88 supra, but it is not so restrictive. It does not require that
the criminal purpose be established exclusively by the act. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01,
Comment, at 49 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
92. The current approach is exemplified by United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370
(5th Cir. 1974).
93. RETHINKING at 144.
94. Id. at 144-46.
95. Id. at 145.
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Professor Fletcher suggests that one of the missing keys to a solu-
tion may be the principle of manifest criminality. 96 Of course, it is
true that when an intended harm does not occur because the
means employed are utterly incapable of success, if we include the
means in the description of the act, then the person will not look
like the kind of criminal he intends to be. So, to elaborate on one
of Professor Fletcher's examples, if Mrs. Smith, believing that
sugar is lethal, dumps some of it into Mr. Smith's coffee with the
intention of poisoning him, so long as we describe her act as dump-
ing sugar into his coffee, we shall not discern criminality and she
will not be guilty of an attempt. But suppose she puts into his cof-
fee the contents of the sugar bowl, which she believes contains arse-
nic (because she put it there for just such a purpose) but in fact
contains sugar (the housekeeper having officiously cleaned the
cupboard and refilled all the bowls). Or suppose she pours the con-
tents of a box labeled "Arsenic" into the coffee, Mr. Smith (perhaps
intending to poison her sometime!) having secretly removed the ar-
senic from the box and replaced it with sugar. It may be a question
whether we ought to convict Mrs. Smith of attempted murder
when she sweetens her husband's coffee. We do not find an answer
to what puzzles us in any of those cases by looking at appearances.
When we convict someone of attempted murder for administering
an almost lethal dose of poison, it is not because she looks like a
murderer but because she came dangerously close to being one.
And when we acquit the evil-intentioned but utterly inept per-
son-in fact a very rare case-it is not because he looks innocent
but because he doesn't get the hang of it enough for us to take the
danger seriously. 97
96. See id. at 149-52. But see id. at 156-57 (indicating need for "an objectivist theory of
liability that is not tied to criteria of manifest criminality").
97. Another example that Professor Fletcher gives, id. at 149, illustrates the same
point. Someone who shoots at a tree stump believing it to be a person whom he intends
to kill may manifest criminality as full as someone who shoots at an empty bed
believing that his intended victim is lying in it. It is not some "shared image" of a mur-
derer that leads us to distinguish such cases but the degree and concreteness of the dan-
ger. Indeed, it is by no means clear that the law would invariably acquit the person who
hits the stump and convict him who blows a hole in the mattress. A great deal would de-
pend on the circumstances. Suppose the stump looked like a human being in the dark and
were in just the place where the would-be killer had every reason to look for his victim,
and the victim were in fact nearby. Suppose, on the other hand, the victim had left his bed
and house empty months before the killer, just returned to the neighborhood from a long
stay abroad, fired at the pillow.
Professor Fletcher fits the puzzles of "impossible attempts" to his theory by applying a
test of manifest "aptness" of the means employed to the actor's purpose. "An apt attempt
is one that manifests danger to the surrounding environment." Id. at 150. In so
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How far back from actual harm we ought to reach with the crime
of attempt is a question for which no unidimensional answer is
likely to be adequate in every case. A secure, confident community
will accept greater risks of harm than one that feels itself threat-
ened by such harm. We may well disagree reasonably about what
lines to draw and on which side of the lines particular cases fall.
Except insofar as they indicate the intention to cause a prohibited
harm or the immediacy of the danger, manifestations of criminality
are not likely to aid us in answering those questions. Nor is it obvi-
ous in which direction the criterion of manifest criminality would
lead. Were we to defer intervention until, having regard exclu-
sively to the actor's present conduct, every possibility other than an
intended crime was eliminated, we might have to wait, beyond rea-
son, until the danger was realized. On the other hand, we might
sometimes intervene sooner than we now do. One can readily im-
agine acts plausibly consistent only with an intended crime-study-
ing the layout of a bank, procuring guns and masks, and so on-
that are yet too far from its realization to constitute an attempt un-
der some formulations of present law.98
Professor Fletcher's references to manifest criminality outside
the area of larceny and attempts reinforce the conclusion that it
has not been a pattern of the criminal law. He discusses manifest
criminality in connection with the related theft offenses of embez-
zlement and false pretenses, only to acknowledge that it has not
been, nor could it well be, of significance for those crimes.99 Bur-
glary, he says, is more to his point; the common law's fine distinc-
tions about which acts constituted a "breaking" and which did not
are said to reflect "judgments designed to capture the manifest
criminality in breaking and entering." 00 The examples he gives by
way of illustration, however, are startingly unpersuasive. Opening
a window or lifting the latch on a door was a "breaking"; but going
doing, he leaves our understanding of the puzzles where it was without the theory. Indeed,
he acknowledges that his analysis in terms of manifest criminality is not generally applica-
ble. Id. at 156-57, 159-60, 184.
98. See, for example, the facts described in United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038
(2d Cir. 1976), in which the defendants' preparations for a bank robbery left no doubt of
their purpose, before the commission of the crime was imminent.
99. RETHINKING at 122-24.
100. Id. at 126. Professor Fletcher describes Blackstone's observation that the felonious
intent must be "demonstrated by some attempt or overt act," 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
40, at *227, as an "effort to retain the principle of manifest criminality." RETHINKINcG at
125-26. That is incorrect. The quoted phrase is part of a discussion about the element of
intent. The "'manner of committing burglary," that is to say the act, is the subject of another
section. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at * 226-27.
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through an already open window was not. 01 Can it seriously be en-
tertained that someone who goes to a door, lifts the latch, and en-
ters through the door manifests his criminality more than someone
who climbs through an open window? Or that the act of opening
the window before climbing in manifests criminality in a way that
climbing through an already open window does not? Professor
Fletcher explains the common law's distinction between going
down a chimney, which was a breaking, and going through the
open window with the observation: "In our ordinary experience,
entering by the chimney is far more incriminating than entering by
an open window."' 0 2 From such examples, he derives a "general
rule of manifest criminality"' 03 in the crime of burglary-but he is
obliged to acknowledge immediately that the common law ignored
the "rule," since it recognized a fraudulent entry as a breaking, as
well as a forcible entry.1 0 4 If such evidence indicates anything, it is
that "manifest criminality" had nothing to do with the law's devel-
opment and has scarcely any explanatory value. 0 5
Professor Fletcher has said that the pattern of manifest criminal-
ity has no application to criminal homicide,' 0 6 as of course it could
not. No "externally identifiable event" readily distinguishes all of
the occasions of noncriminal homicide from murder or manslaugh-
101. RETHINKING at 126.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 126-27.
105. Professor Fletcher discerns "the familiar theme of manifest criminality,"
RETHINKING at 200, in a scattering of other points of the criminal law. He suggests, for ex-
ample, that it helps to explain why courts might accept an inference of guilty intent from
the possession of items "'which experience teaches are generally held for illicit purposes'
more easily than from the possession of items that have common innocent as well as illegal
purposes. Id. (quoting Benton v. United States, 232 F.2d 341, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1956)). One
requires no theory of manifest criminality to understand such reasoning. He finds traces of
manifest criminality in the crime of treason, citing language of Coke that is at best ambigu-
ous on the point, E. COKE, supra note 43, at 5, and a few extracts from cases in the Su-
preme Court; but he concludes that in fact manifest criminality plays no part in that crime.
RETHINKING at 207-18. Relying on a remark in the legislative commentary to a draft of the
proposed federal criminal code, he speculates that "the law of conspiracy" may "witness a
resurgence of the principle of manifest criminality." Id. at 224-25. The context in which
the remark appears is unmistakably contrary to the implication he draws from it. SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., lST SESS., CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMa, ACT OF 1975
at 181 (Comm. Print 1975). It is, of course, well-settled law that the requirement of an
overt act, with which the remark that he quotes is concerned, has nothing whatever to do
with "manifest criminality." Finally, Professor Fletcher believes that in the initial stop-and-
frisk cases, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the
Justices were "drawn intuitively" to the principle of manifest criminality. Id. at 228. To
such argument, one can only respond, "Well, if you say so." It is, in any event, certain, as
he recognizes, that the force of the principle was altogether spent four years later, when
the Court decided Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See RETHINKING at 230.
106. RETHINKING at 121, 233, 235. He also excludes from the scope of his theory a
number of other crimes. See id. at 233-34.
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ter or distinguishes among the various categories of criminal homi-
cide, like voluntary manslaughter and second and first degree
murder, that turn on the actor's intent. The failure of his theory
with respect to homicide, however, is only a particularly obvious
example of its general weakness.107 Its superficial plausibility de-
pends on one's attending narrowly to the sort of aggression against
the person or property of another, like paradigmatic larceny, that
"could not" have an innocent purpose or be prompted innocently
by a mistake. Even when the theory "works," it does not take us be-
yond what we know without it: that often it is possible, in the ab-
sence of unusual circumstances, to infer a person's intention di-
rectly from his act.
The complexities and ambiguity of human behavior and interac-
tion are too great for us to rely on appearances as heavily as the
theory of manifest criminality requires. Our assessment of conduct
depends too much on the reasons why a person acts as he does, the
purposes that motivate him, which do not invariably display them-
selves. Recognition of that moral dimension of our experience lies
behind the consistent emphasis in the criminal law on criminal in-
tent as a separate, independently significant element of liability. To
subordinate the emphasis on intent in favor of manifest criminality
would to that extent deprive criminal law of the element that
makes it most distinctively applicable to human behavior. It would
blunt the law's capacity to take account of distinctions that we feel
deeply to be important.
Nor is it easy to see that it would benefit our liberty. Professor
Fletcher professes to see dangers of oppression in the emphasis on
intention, against which the principle of manifest criminality pro-
vides protection. In particular, he evidently fears that the criminal
law will punish for "bare" intentions or dangerous propensities
unaccompanied by behavior that the law properly prohibits. 08 He
gives no concrete evidence that such danger lurks in our insistence
that criminal behavior be accompanied by criminal intent, how-
ever.10 9 It may be, as he urges, that the definition of some crimes
107. The reason why the inapplicability of the theory to homicide is so obvious is that
the forms of criminal homicide refer explicitly to distinctions according to the actor's intent
that are not "externally" visible in the act of killing itself. The same difficulty is present, al-
beit less obviously, in other crimes that make criminal intent crucial but do not make so
many distinctions on that basis.
108. See pp. 294-95 & note 9 supra.
109. Professor Fletcher makes a good deal of the decision in People v. Ashley, 42
Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271 (1954), in which the California Supreme Court "boldly" held that
a misrespresentation of intention could sustain the charge of obtaining property by false
pretenses. RETHINKING at 11-12; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 523-24, 526-27. The decision, al-
though contrary to the prevailing rule that requires a misstatement of an "existing fact"
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has moved the prohibited act too far back from the harm to be
avoided."10 Surely the way to guard against that is not to minimize
the importance of criminal intent but to insist as strongly that the
area of prohibited behavior not be needlessly expanded. It is worth
noting that insistence on criminal intent as an element of crime has
been, if anything, characteristic of those most concerned to guard
against oppressive results."'
Professor Fletcher argues that although manifest criminality
would not be sufficient to convict, the defendant always having the
possibility of proving that in his case the criminality manifest in his
behavior was deceptive, its absence would be enough to acquit and
presumably to cut off further investigation. How seriously can we
take the argument that those who frame the law and those who ap-
ply it would or should disregard conduct, however threatening or
harmful, that was not criminal on its face? Were that the threshold
that had to be crossed, it is far more likely that a great deal of con-
duct that is not unambiguously criminal would be deemed to cross
it, because otherwise, conduct (accompanied by criminal intent)
that we believe should be criminal would escape." 2 The great dan-
ger of a conceptual framework based on manifest criminality is that
we should become captivated by our own labels and accept too
readily a presumption of actual criminality from that starting
point, leaving it to the defendant to establish the contrary if he can.
To shift our attention away from the harm and toward behavior
manifesting criminality would make it not harder but easier for the
criminal law to sweep up conduct that is better left private. Harm
and intent to commit harm, however difficult the latter sometimes
may be to establish, tie conviction for crime to what is actually the
case. Manifest criminality, for all its vaunted reliance on the "exter-
nal" world of events, depends too much on appearances. "Crimi-
nality," like beauty, too often is in the eye of the beholder.
other than the actor's present intention, e.g., Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697 (D.C.
Cir. 1946), was not novel. The federal mail fraud statute had been interpreted more than
fifty years earlier to include fraudulent representations of intention. Durland v. United
States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896). The opinion in Ashley refers to other earlier decisions or legis-
lation to the same effect. 42 Cal. 2d at 261, 267 P.2d at 280-81. The Reporters for the
Model Penal Code inquired among the jurisdictions allowing prosecutions for false
promises whether the kind of abuse that Professor Fletcher imagines had occurred; the an-
swers were "uniformly negative." MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3, Comment, at 69 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1954). The Model Penal Code adopts the rule of Ashley. Id. § 223.3.
110. If one puts aside the obvious federal jurisdictional concern, Professor Fletcher's
example of interstate travel for a prohibited purpose fairly puts that question. See
RETHINKING at 130-31.
111. E.g., Hart, supra note 11.
112. See pp. 310-15supra.
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